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FACTS OF THE CASE

The vitriol of the Respondents' Brief is probably seen as a wise tactic to be used by
Mr. Green when the facts and the law do not support his position.
For example, no one was found "guilty" of anything. Seep. 3 of Respondents' Brief.
For example, on the first page of the Respondents' factual statement (see p. 3 of
Respondents' Brief) Green states:
On page 1 Weitz makes the
statement that "the fence line acted as a peaceful
and mutually respected property boundary through the . . . . [here follows a long list
of historic events] . . ." Unfortunately, the word "mutually" is false, and the trial
court's decision explains that the only testimony to this effect was "undermined"
and thus not credible.
Emphasis added.
Actually, if the Amended Memorandum Decision is looked to, the lower court clearly states:
The Weitz family claims ownership of the disputed property because of
Consuelo Weitz's family history and association with the property. Mrs. Weitz's
father, Harold Schoepflin, and her grandfather, Fred Schoepflin,previously ran dairy
cattle on the disputed property. It appears this was done until about 1975. Prior to
that time, the Schoepflins treated the disputed property as their own. They
graded the trail in question at will and connected it with numerous other roads
traversing their property to the north. They maintained the fence, which
encroached on the Rogers' property. During the 1970's Homer Ferguson leased the
Rogers' property from Inez Rogers, the Rogers' family matriarch, t o m cattle on it.
Mr. Ferguson testified that Mrs. Rogers told him in the mid-1970's that the fence,
which borders the disputed property, constituted the boundary between the
Schoepflin's property and the Rogers' property. However, Mrs. Rogers' son,
Thomas Rogers, undermined the testimony attributed to his mother when he
testified that he doubted his mother had ever seen the fence in question. He also
testified his mother died in 2001 and he managed the property as the trustee for his

family's trust following her death. He also testified he considered the property
boundary to be the quarter section line, not the disputed fence.
Seepages 3-4 ofthe Amended Memorandum Decision (emphasis added); R Vol. VIII, p. 1638-1639.
Thus, compare the lower court's finding to that which Green has espoused on page 3 of the
Respondents' Brief. There is no doubt in anyone's mind that up until 1975the disputedpropertywas
a dairy farm operated by Mrs. Weitz's family from 1929 up until 1975. These facts remained
uncontroverted throughout the trial and the Respondents are only now attempting to contradict these
facts by a twisted reading of the word "undermined" by Green in his Respondents' Brief. The
Appellants herein invite this Court to read Mr. Ferguson's testimony with care. He leased the
Rogers' property, he ran his cattle up to the fence line in question, and treated the fence line in
question as the boundary based upon the conversation he had with Mrs. Rogers. Mr. Ferguson has
no axe to grind or benefit to gain. He did what he did and he testified to it fully and honestly.
Mr. Rogers' brief testimony was used in an attempt to undermine that of Mr. Ferguson with the
rationale that Mr. Rogers had entered into an agreement with Mr. Green to defend the title so he "had
no interest in the outcome of the case." Really? Mr. Rogers lost over $46,000.00 to Mr. Green
because of the claim the Weitzes had made to the disputed property in question. Mr. Rogers was
trustee of a trust holding the property in question. Can he turn to the beneficiaries of that tmst and
state, "Oops, I shouldn't have given up over $46,000.00 to Mr. Green back in 2005"?

Mr. Ferguson is the witness that truly had no interest in the outcome of the case. Even
Mr. Rogers acknowledged that he would have to defer to Mr. Ferguson's account because
Mr. Roger's mother dealt with Mr. Ferguson directly. Tr Vol. IT. p.1769, LL. 17-20. As has been
noted, Mrs. Rogers passed away in 2001 and has never testified in this matter in any capacity and
her son did not become involved with the property until 2001 when he managed the family trust
following his mother's death.
On a separate issue within the Respondents' Brief, Green states on page 3:
On page 8 it is asserted that Weitz (actually the predecessor in interest) leased a
portion of the disputed property to others. The lease, however, does not purport
to lease property in the disputed area, but leases only in the area included in
Weitz's predecessors' deed.
Emphasis added.
Exactly! This is actually a factually accurate statement, but now let us take away
Respondents' twist. This assertion is totally supportive of the Appellants' position in this matter.
The lease which Green references is in regard to the 10-year lease entered into with the County of
Latah and the City of Moscow to allow for the establishment of the radio station which was then
recorded as Instrument No. 223360 in Latah County. Thus, the legal description of the lease is what
was inserted in the lease, but the City of Moscow, the County of Latah, and all others placed the
radio station on the disputed property ia question. Not only did they place the radio station on the
disputed property in question, then they cut a straight swath through the trees so as to place power
lines to the radio station. This swath of trees was cut on the disputed property in question. The

access to the radio station is and was on the disputed property in question. The lease even had the
specific language that states:
It is agreed and understood between these parties that the first party will make
arrangements with the Washington Water Power for the building of a power line to
said premises and for necessary access roads to said premises, but the second party
will assist in such arrangements if such assistance becomes necessary.
See Plaintiffs' Exhibit #24, p. 1.
Thus, not only did the City of Moscow, the County of Latah, the Latah County Sheriffs'
office and officers, and the Moscow Police Department and officers think and act as though the
disputed property belong to the Weitzes' predecessor in title, but so did Washington Water Power.
Let us simply pause and think for a moment. Were all of these political entities, police
officers, sheriffs deputies, and Washington Water Power representatives trespassers at the time? Or,
did all of these good people go about their business in a professional and competent way, assuming
that the disputed property in question belonged to the Weitzes' predecessor in title. So, again, when
Green states ". . . leases only in the area included in Weitz's predecessors' deed" that is Appellants'
point in its entirety. All of the people in the surrounding area that had any involvement with the
property did not question Weitzes' title, but actually in their own minds and hearts believed, that the
property belonged to the Weitzes. Mr. Norman Clark testified extensively regarding his work
concerning the building and maintaining of the repeater station with Mr. Merle Hart. He clearly
establishes that the radio station was located within the disputed area. Mr. Clark's knowledge of the

details included within the repeater station lent even more credibility to his testimony. Tr Vol. 11,
p. 1245.
Mr. Allen Drew also located the radio station upon the disputed property and talks about
hearing the relays clicking when he was on the perimeter road. Tr Vol. 11, p. 1230, LL. 14-17.
Respondents' Brief makes a dramatic acknowledgment: the lease was for areas within the
Weitzes legal description, and all of the parties know that the radio shack and the road was clearly
within the disputed property. That is the essence ofwhat this case is all about. The location of the
lines between the section lines was not known. No survey locating the northernboundary line existed
in 1929 or when the lease was signed, or when the dairy cattle covered the area. All these good
people lived with the fence line being the property line for years until Mr. Green arrived and put his
blinders on and went about his business.
Next, the last paragraph of page 3 and the top of page 4 of the Respondents' Brief makes
reference to Mr. Richards' testimony. Green attempted to use Mr. Richards' testimony to somehow
establish that their alleged damage in removing some of this shrubbery amounted to over
$186,000.00 after trebling. Again, Weitzes invite this Court to read the cross-examination of
Mr. Richards. Not only did Mr. Richards conclude, as their expert, that replacing such shrubbery
at such costs would be "stupid" and "unwise," (Tr Vol. 11,p. 1642, LL. 6-15) but he also answered
question after question as an objective person approaching the property in question. Mr. Richards
was a biased expert in the sense that he was a paid expert witness by the Greens, but he answered
candidly and honestlywhen questions were put to him on cross-examinationconcerninghow certain
5

things would alert him to the fact that someone else was laying claim to the property in question.
He agreed that the location of the radio station, the road, the blue steel gate, and the swath cut
through the trees for the power line, and the fact that the power line at one time fed the radio station
in question, would all alert him to the fact that someone else was asserting ownership of the disputed
property in question. Tr Vol. II, pp. 1643, LL. 23-25; 1655, LL. 1-4.
Anyone going upon the disputed property in question, as Mr. Green did prior to his purchase,
would be put on notice of another's claim to the property in question. Let me provide a scenario of
what a person might see and think: upon traversing the property:
Large blue steel gate:
b

Who placed it there?

b

At what cost?
For what purpose?

Radio Station:
b

Who placed it there?

w

For what purpose?
How long had it been there?

c

How many people over the many, many years of its existence
had accessed it and used it?

•

If they were accessing it and using it, whose permission
did they have?

If it was leased by the Sheriffs Department and Police
Department, i.e. public entities, did they feel comfortable
and secure with the fact that they were dealing with whom
all parties felt was the proper and lawful owner of the
disputed property?
The swath through the trees:
t

Who would actually cut trees down on property owned
by another?

*

If they cut the trees down, &om whom did they obtain
permission?

h

Why would they cut a swath through the trees? For
the power line? If it involved a power line, wouldn't this
deal with a public utility, such as Washington Water
Power (at the time)?

The road on the disputed property:
F

Who placed it there?

t

What other roads did it connect to?

F

This road interconnects with many other roads that
have a meeting point at the Weitzes home. Would
you follow that road to its end? [Remember, even the
lower court found they (Weitzes predecessor in title)
graded the trail in question at will and connected it
with numerous other roads traversing their
property to the north. See p. 4 of Amended
Memorandum Decision; R Vol. VIII p. 1639.1

Would you talk to the many neighbors in the immediate area who had lived
there for years?
t

Mr. Green testified that he did not talk to any of the neighbors.

+

Mr. Green testified that he did not even attempt
to talk to the Weitzes before his purchase.
Mr. Green testified that he had been living in the
Viola area since 1995, (Tr Vol. 11, pp. 1116) and
he still did not make inquiry concerning the
disputed property in question.

Would one talk to the predecessor in title?
+

Mr. Green testified that he did not even talk to the
people from whom he purchased the property as to
the disputed property. (See Tr Vol. II,pp. 1138,
LL. 92-5; 1139, LL. 1-9)

F

Mr. Green testified that he had at least three
surveyors on the property in question and still did
not make inquiry as to the ownership of the disputed
property.
Mr. Green's surveyor testified that he placed
the fence line of the property in question on his
survey, and it was his surveyor who was able to
clearly demark where the fence line in question
was located. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibit #3.)

Even Mr. Green in trying to create a basis for their defense was quite helpful. Mr. Green
noticed the disputed fence line nineteen times.

Q.

Okay. Along the fence line you located a minimum of 19 points that you felt
were significant enough to photograph; is that correct?

A.

There's 19, yes.

Tr Vol. II,p. 1482, LL. 16-19.

Respondents' Brief argues that this occurred after Mr. Green's purchase, it can be surmised
he had his blinders on earlier.
In the Respondents' Brief on page 1, Green states:

As part of the sale agreements to Shooks and Castles Mr. and Mrs. Green agreed
to defend any suit brought by Weitz, and the Greens have done so. In addition, the
agreements specified that if any land was lost to Weitz, the Greens were to reimburse
Shook and Castle at the purchase price per acre for any land lost. This has not been
necessary since the Greens were successful in defending their title against Weitz.
Seep. 1 of Respondents' Brief.
Thus, what Green is admitting is that by putting his blinders on in aconvenient manner when
he viewed the disputed property on his "25, 30 trips up there," (Tr Vol. II, p. 1124, L. 6 and p. 11
of Appellants' Brief) he obtained a reduction of over $46,000.00 in contract price based upon the
Weitzes' claim against the Rogers. Thus, he has now pocketed that money, has not paid Shook nor
Castle a dime of it, and is now reaping the benefit of his ingenuity.
At this juncture, one should take a moment to pause and think. When Mr. Green and the
attorneys were upon the disputed property in question and alter the Weitzes made their claim known,
did Mr. Green argue the spuriousness of the Weitzes' claim or the legitimacy of the claim? The
Iitigationwith the Weitzes had not yet commenced. Mr. Greenwas demanding financial concessions
from the Rogers. Apparently, they saw enough evidence to warrant reducing the purchase price to
Mr. Green by an exact per acre figure for the land clearly marked on Mr. Monson's survey from the
"existing fence" to the north. Did Rogers and his attorneys just brush aside the legitimacy of
Weitzes' claim, or did they concede over $46,000.00 due to the legitimacy of the claim?

Green saw the opportunity of a life time. Green pocketed the $46,000.00 and then Green tried
to take his ingenuity, colored with greed, and lay claim to damages in excess of $186,000.00 for
bramble bush his own expert said would be "stupid" and "unwise" to replace in any manner, and
that it was nothing more than fuel for forest fires.
RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

The first "Additional Issue on Appeal" argued by Respondents is that Idaho Code jj 6-

202 was violated by the Weitzes in cutting down these "240 trees." However, when the record is
addressed, it is clear that what occurred at that moment in time is what should have occurred.
Mr. Green had obtained legal counsel. Mr. Green's legal counsel had calculated out the
amount of damages that he was pursuing against the Rogers. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit #48 and also
p. 40 of Appellants' Brief which read as follows:
Repay Dan Castle - Tract 1
1.91 acres @ $4,000.OO/acre =

$7,640.00

Repay Steve and Mary Shook - Tract 2
3.66 acres @ $4,745.82/acre =

17,369.70

Loss of value of Green's parcel - Tract 3
3 acres @ $4,745.82/acre =

14,237.46

Cost to re-survey property and
Re-write legal descriptions

2,500.00

Legal fees

4.500.00

TOTAL DAMAGESICOSTS

This correspondence again reveals that the settlement amount of $46,247.16 was specifically
calculated on aper acre basis. In other words, despite the Greens' characterization of the settlement,
the payment did in fact represent compensation &om the Rogers for the property that Weitzes
claimed.
Good! The matter was settled. As the lower court finds in its Amended Memorandum
Decision:
However. the mavamen of the testimonv was that it aooeared the dispute would go
m.Mrs. Weitz testified at trial that she was advised by her lawyer, Mr. Landeck
"[tlhat he anticipated settlement with the Rogers and he looked for the whole
problem to just go away." (citation omitted) Ron Landeck, former counsel to the
Weitz family, testified at his deposition that he advised Mrs. Weitz that the "problem
may go away." (citation omitted)

See p. 11 of Amended Memorandum Decision; R Vol. VITI, p. 1646 (emphasis added).
What would a normal, reasonable human being who had been in possession of the disputed
property personally or through her grandfather expect? She and her family laid claim to the property
since 1929, and they thought of the property as their own. Mr. Green has made claim against the
Rogers, the predecessors in title in regard to the value of the disputed property and that matter is now
settled and done. Is this not what a normal human being in a normal world would conclude? Case
closed. Is this the mind set of a trespasser as contemplated by I.C. S) 6-202 and the case law that has
already been briefed?
Mr. Green, of course, was spurred on by greed. He had his $46,247.16 and now he wanted
more, more, and more.

2.

Mr. Green cannot help himself. Even on this appeal, despite his own expert's

testimony, and despite the facts of the case, he cannot restrain himself alleging his second
"Additional Issue on Appeal:"
The court made a legal error in the award of damages for the 240 trees cut by Mr. and
Mrs. Weitz when it based its award for the temporary injury to property on the
merchantable value of the trees cut, instead of using the correct measure of the cost
of restoring the trees.
Seep. 5 of Respondents' Brief.
The facts of the case are clear- there were not 240 trees cut. For Green to make such an
allegation in this Respondents' Brief is in direct contradiction to the testimony given by his own
experts, by the arborist who cut the shrubbery, and by the various dimensions that have been set forth
in the record of the shrubbery that was removed.
On this appeal, Green is contending that "240 trees were cut." Yet, if there really were 240
trees located upon the disputed property in question, would not Green have made a claim for the
value of said timber against the Rogers? Again, look above at the itemization of the damages by
Green's legal counsel (see Plaintiffs Exhibit #48). He is very careful to include a per acre value of
the land, cost to resurvey the property, and to rewrite the legal descriptions and even their legal fees.
He puffed the dollar figure up as high as he possibly could. Do you think Green would not have
pounced upon the opportunity to lay claim to 240 trees that were standing on this pristine property,
the value of which he would now he denied?

ARGUMENT
I.

BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE

Of course, Green has to rely upon the Amended Memorandum Decision issued by the lower
court who hadmade an on-site visit to the property in question, but when did this on-site visit occur?
c

Approximately 76 years after the original fence was erected.
31 years after the disputed property was used as a dairy farm

b

Over 25 years after Homer Ferguson ran his cattle upon the
property in question.
Of course, the lower court was not able to observe the usage that
was made by the Weitzes of the disputed property in question
from 1929 onward.

b

The lower court was not even able to observe the property as
Mr. Green observed it on his 25 to 30 visits while using his four
wheeler with its 46" axle base traversing the '"road in question
numerous times." See Tr Vol. 11, p.1123, LL.22-25; p.1124,
LL.l-13.

Is the lower court's visual observation on a singular day going to brush aside the entire
history of the property in question?
The lower court in its Amended Memorandum Decision states:
Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had been most recently bladed by Mrs.
Weitz's father around 1994.

See page 6 of the Amended Memorandum Decision; R Vol. VIE, p. 1641.
Is not this evidence of continued use and ownership by the Weitzes of the disputed property
in question and the fact that a road indeed did exist at least from 1975 (when the dairy farm ceased).

The disputedpropertywas last used as adairy farm up until 1994when the lower court indicated that
it was last bladed by Mrs. Weitz's father. Thus, at least, prior to1994 the Weitzes would bring a
bulldozer upon the property and blade the roadway clear of fallen trees and debris. (Remember, Mr.
Green moved to the Viola area in 1995.) Thus, as of 1994 the lower court's finding would reflect:

They graded the trail in question at will and connected it with numerous other
roads traversing their property to the north.
Seep. 4 of Amended Memorandum Decision; R Vol. VIII, p.1639 (emphasis added).
Then the lower court says of the roadway upon its visit:
It did not annear, on the ground, to be part of the seamless web of roadways
extending onto the Weitzes' family property.

Seep. 6 of Amended Memorandum Decision; R Vol. VIII, p. 1641 (emphasis added).
Again, the lower court is clearly stating that the road was bulldozed by the Weitzes as
recently as 1994, both parties agreed that it was again bulldozed in 2002 after which an injunction
was obtained and no further activity on the disputed propertywas allowed. Does this history of use:
dairy farms, bulldozing, radio stations, power lines, large blue steel gate, and all other activities of
ownership, possession, and control have to be ignored simply because the lower court found that "It

did not appear . . .". Id.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the following:
Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had not been used by the Weitz family in a
continuous fashion for the required five years. Although there was evidence the
Weitz family and their friends used the trail periodically during the period in
question, the use was not continuous. Consequently, the Weitz family has failed to
establish the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement to the trail.

See p. 6 of Amended Memorandum Decision; R Vol. VIU, p. 1641 (emphasis added).
So, the lower court finds that the Weitzes used the property in question, used the roadway
in question as an extension, but did not use the roadway "in a continuous fashion." Given the
circumstances, what is a "continuous fashion?" The trail was "bladed," using the lower court's
words, by a bulldozer operated by Mrs. Weitz's father around 1994. Additionally, the evidence
presented by the Weitzes was replete with evidence of usage throughout the decades, from 1975
onward.
The testimony was varied, complete, and overwhelming concerning usage.
Gerald Rockford "Rocky" Weitz testified at the trial concerning his usage as follows:
Q.

Well, let's talk about the perimeter road and I'll come back to the loop road.

A.

On the perimeter road we would ride either single file or two abreast
or passing, kind ofjust depended on who was riding and who was in
front and who was in back. And so we would go along the entire
length from the west end where it connects into the Weitz road
network there and then all the way up and then down the other side.
That was the most frequent route, but sometimes we would go
through the bench roads as well because with snowmobiling
especially, like my brother and I, he would like to hit powder, fresh
powder and so we pretty much all of the road would be snowmobiled
on throughout the winter. And so, yeah, that's the usage.

Tr. Vol. I, p. 864, LL. 11-24.
Dr. Tory Eugene Lawrence, an Associate Professor at the School of Music for the University
of Idaho, who now lives in Eugene, Oregon, working on his doctorate, testified that in December of
2001 he was upon the property from late 2001 through the summer of 2002 and thereafter. He was

an avid hiker and he testified concerning the status of the road prior to the bulldozing by Mr. Weitz
in the fall of 2002. See Tr. Vol. 11, pp. 1842,1847, and1848. He described the road leading up to
the road on the disputed property being in the same condition as the perimeter road:
A.

I would say they were the same as the perimeter road or this ridge road. I
don't think they were as heavily used, but they certainly were the same scope
of road. I mean, I actually asked Mrs. Weitz, who made all these roads?
There's roads everywhere up there.

Tr. Vol. 11, p. 1848, LL. 4-8.
In describing the disputed fence he stated:

A.

I remember seeing barbed wire, again the point of -- you're speaking of this
June?

Q.

I'm speaking the time period before fall of 2002.

A.

Okay. What I remember most clearly was the tour that I referred to with
Mrs. Weitz. In a number of places around the property she would point out
where the fence was. The purpose of this was to show me where their
property began and ended. So I do remember as there were certain places you
could see, obviously because it was closer to that fence because of the wind
of that road and we saw that, yes. I remember barbed wire. . . . And I don't
know how many wires there were, but there were multiple wires anyway.

Tr Vol. 11, p. 1848, LL. 18-25 and p. 1849, LL. 1-8.
Another witness was Dr. Curtis Wiggins, adentist from Lewiston, Idaho. As to the disputed
property and the road in question, he testified:
A.

We moved in '8 1 and for the first oh, I would say through the 80s my family,
we went up to their property and we snowmobiled up on those roads on
several different occasions. And we were also on them in the summertime
also.

Tr Vol. 11p. 1256, LL. 9-13.

Q.

Could you describe to the Court your familiarity with that -- that network of
roads?

A.

We did a lot of our snowmobiling at night. And I do remember, with my
poor sense of direction, that if you got on one of those auxiliary roads and
followed it downhill you ended up to the Weitzes' house. And this was all
done at night, so getting lost was not an issue.

Tr Vol. II. p. 1257, LL. 1-7
In regard to obtaining firewood from the disputed property, Dr. Wiggins testified:
Q.

What did you use, what vehicle did you use up there?

A.

They used a four-wheel drive John Deere tractor and attached to the back of
the John Deere tractor is a -- a wagon or a cart or a trailer I should say. And
the trailer would hold about a cord of wood and that's how we accessed the
area that we got wood.

Tr Vol. II, p. 1259, LL. 8-14.
As to his last visit to the property in question, in 2001, Dr. Wiggins states:

Q.

Okay. What was the purpose for being on the property then?

A.

It was an evening snowmobiling trip or snowmobile ride on their property.

Q.

And did that trip take you to the perimeter road, the disputed property?

A.

That's correct. Went through the perimeter road, out through the gate and to
Moscow Mountain.

Tr Vol. 11, p. 1261, LL. 8-15.
The gate Dr. Wiggins is referring to is the large, steel, blue gate that has been referenced
multiple times.

Mr. Josh Ritter was also asked to testify:
Q.
A.

What type of things -- and I'm going to come back to that. What type of
activities would you do on the Weitzes' property in general?
Well, with the Weitzes, besides the -- besides, you know, just on my own
walking to the Weitzes', you know, quite often, I would, you know, we did
all sorts of things from, from around '85 onwards. You know, we did all
kinds of playing in the woods when I was little, you know, running around,
you know, just all over the place up there. And then, you know, as we got
older, motorcycling, snowmobiling, we did both ofthose as well, all the time.

Seep. 10, LL. 11-23 of the Deposition of Joshua Ritter which was submitted to the lower court for
evidentiary purposes.
Mr. Ritter also testified:

Q.

And then in your own words, just describe to me the type of activities that
would have taken place, that you would have enjoyed or taken place in and
on that area of the land that we've described as the disputed property during
that time period?

A.

Oh, I would say it was, it was, you know, it was always -- it was always
recreational. You know, it was either snowmobiling in the winter or, or
motorcycling. Or a lot of times, you know, in the summerjust playing along
there. I mean, that was the ridge. You know, that was where you could look.

Id. p. 11, LL. 15-25.

A.

Well, yeah, like driving around, I mean, all the time, you know, there was
always one part of the road that was getting kind of, I guess, replowed by
Jerry in particular like along with the Caterpillar, you know, and, you
know, I can remember him doing that all the time, up through there,
taking the Caterpillar and just kind of working on a road here and there
and just kind of redoing it, just kind of running the Cat over the road.

So, there's that. I can also, we -- you know, I went up with the
Weitzes four or five times at least helping them get wood for the
winter in different, in different places.

Id. p. 18, LL. 10-22 (emphasis added).
Thus, as can be seen by Mr. Ritter's childhood memories, plowing the roads in general,
plowing the perimeter road on the disputed property in particular, was the norm. As noted above,
even the lower court noted that the property was plowed in 1994 with specificity. Thus, it is
perplexing when the lower court states on page 3 of its Amended Memorandum Decision that after
the surveyor placed some survey markings that:
As an apparent result of the surveyor's actions, the Weitz family sprang into action.

R VOI.vm, p. 1638.
Was it springing into action when the Weitzes bulldozed in 1994, as found by the lower
court; was it springing into action whenMr. Ritter testified openly and honestly in his deposition that
his childhood memory was of Mr. Weitz bulldozing the various roads throughout the property in
order to maintain the interconnectingroad system that they had established over the many years that
they owned the property in question?
The testimony not mentioned by the lower court in its Memorandum Decision concerning
Weitzes usage of the disputed property was overwhelming:

Gerald Rockford Weitz

Tr Vol. I, pp. 839 to 891; 917 to 922

Homer Ferguson

Tr Vol. I, pp. 892 to 917

James Henry Hagedorn

Tr Vol. I, pp. 922 to 943

Jack Freeland

Tr Vol. I. pp. 943 to 962

Nancy Flisher

Tr Vol. I, pp. 975 to 991

James Edward Weitz

Tr Vol. I, pp. 991 to 1013

Allen Drew

Tr Vol. 11, pp. 1225 to 1233

Walter Carlson

Tr Vo1. 11,pp. 1235 to 1243

Norman Clark

Tr Vol. II., pp. 1243 to 1254

Curtis Wiggins

Tr Vol. II., pp. 1255 to 1264

Consuelo Weitz

Tr Vol. 11, pp. 1266 to 1271; 1286 to1364

Dustin F. Weitz

Tr Vol. II., pp. 1272 to 1286

Harold Osborne

Tr Vol. 11, pp. 1365 to 1415

Tory Eugene Lawrence

Tr Vol. II, pp. 1841 to 1859

In the Respondents' Brief, Green tried to establish that he was a bonafide purchaser, but he
ends up hying to argue around the following:

*

The fence.
Mr. Green traversing the fence many times.

Mr. Green traversing the road in question many times with his
four wheeler.
The radio station.

•

The rusted steel h m attached to a tree with word "line" cut in it.

Then he has to ignore the following:
b

The swath through the trees.

t

The blue steel gate.

t

That although the fence is in disrepair, was specifically attached
to numerous large trees that were acting as fence posts for
the fence in question. (Slices of these trees are in evidence.)

11.

SHELTER RULE

It is impossible to argue that Shook and Castle were BFP's when the very contract that they
signed with Green put them on notice of the Weitzes' claim (see Exhibit #8 & #9), but more
importantly, if Mr. Green was not aBFP neither were Shook and Castle, because the shelter rule as
cited by Respondents does not apply.
111.

SITE VIEW BY THE TRIAL JUDGE

The discussion as set forth above concerning bonafidepurchaser already takes issue with the
site viewed by the trial judge.
IV.

BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT

There is no doubt in this matter that the Appellants have met the two elements quoted by
Green to establish boundary by agreement.

1.

First, Green states that the Weitzes would have "to prove an uncertain or disputed

boundary involving adjacent properties." See p. 12 of Respondents' Brief. There is no doubt that
the properties in question are adjacent and there is no doubt that the fence line in question was

erected in 1929, before any surveys were ever conducted. The parties did not know where the
boundary was, they put up the fence and treated it as the boundary for over 74 years. By the lower
court's own finding, it clearly established the fence line as the boundary from 1929 to 1975. From
1975 onward the fence did go into disrepair, but even by the lower court's own finding, the Weitzes
were bulldozing the road in question up until 1994. Thus, the evidence is set to establish that from
1975 to 1994 the Weitzes went to the extent of bulldozing the road in question as only a property
owner would. The Weitzes again bulldozed in 2002, but now it was viewed as an act and violation
of Mr. Green's property rights; whereas, in 1994 it was viewed as a continuation of the Weitzes
claim to the property in question. The Weitzes fence line or "boundary by agreement" should not
be diminished because the road did go into an overgrown state simply because the Weitzes are
following a court order.
2.

Secondly, the Weitzes "would have had to prove a subsequent express or implied

agreement fixing the boundary." See p. 12 of Respondents' Brief. It would appear that the use of
the fence line from 1929onward would be evidence of an agreement fixing the boundary. To ignore
that would be a revision of history which already speaks so loudly in this matter. Green relies upon
Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 127 P3d 167 (2005), but when the law of the case is set forth and
the case is viewed, it is totally supportive of the Weitzes' position in this matter. Green attempts to
argue that the disputed area of land encompassedby the fence line is an"irregu1ar"piece ofproperty.
By Green's own surveyor, the fence struck off in a direction that was closely parallel to what would
ultimately be viewed as the survey boundary line many decades later. See Plaintiffs' Exhibit #3
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which also contains detailed reference points. Was it exactly straight? No. Given what they had to
work with in 1929, was it a fairly straight rendition of a boundary line as between two neighbors?
Absolutely.
Green relies upon Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,495,50 P. 3d 987,990 (2002) which talks
about temporary fence to house cattle. The testimony in this matter at hand has shown that the fence
was in existence since 1929; not only that, but it showed that it was in constant repair and
replenishment from 1929until 1975 in order to maintain dairy cattle and support a dairy farm. There
is nothing temporary about the Weitzes' fence.
Finally, Green relies upon Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 166 P.3d 382 (2007) which
involved the fence next to some unimproved property. It did not involve a fence established in 1929
for the purpose of maintaining dairy cattle. It did not include facts which clearly showed that the
neighboring property (in this case, the Rogers' property) was leased for the purpose ofrunning cattle
and that the fence in question was used as the demarkation of the boundary line for cattle running
purposes. Nor did it involve the fact that aerial views show the separate properties over the years
have been clearly distinctive. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 40B, which also contains a beautiful overlay
that juxtaposes the location of the property precisely. The Weitzes have done selective logging over
the many years, maintaining the heavy forest growth on the disputed property and north of the
disputed property line in question. The Rogers primarily clear-cut their property and used it for
cattle grazing purposes. The Rogers' property was actively used, logs cut and hauled, and leased out
with instructions to Mr. Ferguson that the fence line was the boundary line.
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V.

PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT

The argument in regard lo prescriptive easement is already addressed above and also in
Appellants' initial brief in this matter. But, let there be no uncertainty in regard to the adverse
possession claim, which was clearly established in this matter by the lower court's own opinion, the
right to simply amend Weitzes' Complaint months before trial was requested in areasonable fashion
and before any noteworthy discovery had occurred.

VI.

QUASI-ESTOPPEL

Green's brief does not add any illumination to the quasi-estoppel position that the Weitzes
have expressed in the Appellants' Brief. It must be remembered that Mr. Green's agreement with
the Rogers was a secret and it was attempted to be kept from the Weitzes when depositions were
initiated. The fact that they were using the Weitzes' claim to get paid money by the Rogers and then
turn around and seek the same property from the Weitzes, along with over $186,000.00 and some
odd measure of damages, is simply, by definition, unconscionable.
VII.

DENIAL OF WEITZ'S MOTION TO AMEND TO ADD A CLAIM FOR
ADVERSE POSSESSION

1.

Prejudice. In the Respondents' Brief, Green sets forth various deadlines in March

and June of 2005, which existed immediately prior to the Weitzes making their motion to amend
their Complaint. It must be remembered that the Complaint already contained a prescriptive
easement claim. On appeal, Green is arguing that somehow these deadlines posed an imposition for
him, but he did not argue that at the time of the motion to amend because there would have been no

need to revise any of those deadlines. The Weitzes would not have changed their experts; the
Weitzes would not have changed their lay witnesses; the Greens would not have disclosed different
experts; and the Greens would not have disclosed different lay witnesses. This was a court trial not
a jury trial. Given the fact that prescriptive easement had already been plead by the Weitzes, Green
cannot now, at this late date, claim that he somehow would have been prejudiced, when in fact such
did not occur in 2005.
2.

Failure to State a Valid Claim. The proposed amended complaint was sufficient.

The substantial enclosure must have been substantial enough to enclose dairy cattle for almost 50
years. In regard to the payment of taxes, this issue has already been addressed in the Appellants'
Brief and the government lot exemption applies in a situation such as this, as has been briefed. The
facts of this case become very clear - that no metes and bounds survey existed prior to that which
Mr. Green created. The disputed fence was the boundary for almost 50 years and thereafter. The
government lot exemption, as discussed in Appellants' Brief, clearly addresses this issue. The
elements of prescriptive easement are almost identical to that of adverse possession.
3.

Futility. The motion to amend the complaint to allow for adverse possession

certainly cannot be futile when the lower court has found that adverse possession existed from 1929
to 1975. As already briefed, once adverse possession occurs title to the property vests.

A peculiar aspect of the adverse possession claim is that the Court in its Amended
Memorandum Decision found:

In 1988, the Idaho Department of Lands put up a marker on the northeast comer of
the Rogers' property. That boundary marker constituted notice that the true property
line between the Weitz family's property and the Rogers' property was north of the
fence in question.
Seep. 5 of the Amended Memorandum Decision; R Vol. VEI, p. 1640.
Thus, by the lower court's own finding, as of 1988 the Weitzes would have known where the
true boundary line was, and, thus, their use, possession, and control of the property from 1988
forward would have definitely been adverse. This adversity would have included bulldozing the
property, removing firewood from the property, snowmobiling and motorcycling with friends and
family, felling some trees from the property, maintaining the road in question, etc.

VIII. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND REMAND
BPP Status of Green. The issue of whether or not Mr. Green is a true BFP has already been
argued above and in Appellants' Brief.

Exclusive use. The exclusivity of the Weitzes' use is unchallenged, including firewood
removal, bulldozing, maintenance of the road, etc. etc. Adverse possession andlor the boundaryby
acquiescence had been established for decades and allowing others to traverse your property over
the last few years does not mean that you are abandoning any and all property rights that had been
established for decades before. Did a hiker or neighbor walk upon the property? Yes, of course, on
occasion, but this does not void the ownership interest established by the Weitzes over decades.

Enclosure. The lower court's own finding and the facts of the case clearly supportedthe use
of the disputed property in question for dairy farm purposes and that the fence must have been secure
enough to have contained the dairy cattle over the years.
The lower court originallyruled in the Weitzes' favor as to the slander of title issue as aresult
of the evidence presented at trial in October of 2005. Without further testimony, the lower court
changed its mind the following year. In June of 2006, the lower court found that when the Weitzes
were placing some hog wire up and the hog wire fell 60 feet short of connecting in a comer where
there was heavy brush that this somehow gave rise to a slander of title claim. Idaho is and always
has been a notice pleading state. For the lower court to reverse itself and find that somehow, by the
filing of a quiet title action by the Weitzes, that the Weitzes somehow slandered the title of
Mr. Green's property is simply unimaginable.
TAXES

Respondents argue that the Assessor's Office would use aerial photographs in order to
establish taxability of the private property in question. This truly would have been a sight to see in
1929.
The affidavit of Mr. Steve Fiscus, the tax assessor for Latah County from 1989 until 2005,
clarifies that he does not rely upon aerial photography that never existed at the relevant times in
question.

Mr. Fiscus specifically states on pages 27 and 28 of Appellants' Brief:

6.

On the tax assessment valuations, when you see, for example 160 acres, that
is just the tax assessor's estimate of the number of acres in a given quarter
section, but your affiant can represent to you without any doubt that said
acreage is an estimate and is not accurate. The boundary between the two
properties in question was not located by tax assessors for tax assessment
purposes.

7.

If the property that is being assessed is not given a specific metes and hounds
description, then the exact boundaries of the property of the respective
landowners is a matter of guesstimating and the amount of acreage within a
quarter section is also a matter of guesstimating. The exact quantum of
property being assessed is impossible to determine from the tax assessment
records. The exact location of the section line or quarter section line is
unknown for tax assessment purposes.

See R Vol. ID,pp. 720-721.

IX.

SLANDER OF TITLE

The lower court's ruling on the slander of title is simply not understandable. Not only did
the lower court change its opinion without having additional testimony, hut it also seems to pounce
upon a singular sentence contained in the complaint in a quiet title action. The lower court then
states that this statement was made maliciously by the Weitzes in pursuing their quiet title action.
On page 34 of Respondents' Brief, they state:
The most important witness was Gerald Weitz himself when a portion of his
deposition testimony was accepted in evidence and read by the court as a deposition
of a party opponent.

Id.

Mr. Gerald Weitz was not even called as a witness at the trial in this matter, and only a
portion of his deposition was given to the court. The fact that the Weitzes tried to maintain and
repair the fence, and ran out of some hog wire down in a comer of the property is now the basis of
a slander of title which the lower court enters in June of 2006, some 9 months after Dr. Weitz's
deposition was taken in September of 2005. The deposition was not even submitted in its entirety.
The court originally found no slander of title, and no malice.

X.

THE LOWER COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED I.C.
FOR TRESPASS

9 6-202. ACTIONS

The facts concerning this aspect of Respondents' case have been exhaustively addressed
above, as well as in Appellants' Brief.

Mrs. Weitz was "unreasonably optimistic" when she

assumed after Mr. Green's claim against the Rogers had reached a settlement that it would bring this
matter to an end, and that he would leave her and the property with which she (and her family before
her) had been associated with since 1929 alone. How could she have known Mr. Green had the
agenda that he did?

XI.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES

Again, Mr. Green's attempt to turn the shrubbery that was fuel for a forest fire into some type
of claim exceeding $180,000.00 is simply untenable. As discussed above, it is inappropriate.
Additionally, expert testimony was given at trial (see Tr Vol. II, pp. 1837-1938) by
Mr. Dean Vahlkamp that the impact upon the property in question was absolutely none.

XII.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

As discussed in detail above and in Appellants' Brief, the basis for the Weitzes' appeal in
this matter is certainly well-founded.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Weitzes hereby respectfully request this Court to:
1)

Determine that they are the proper owners and in possession of the property in

question by reason of the boundary by agreement and/or acquiescence argument, and/or that
Mr. Green is estopped from contesting the Weitzes' claim to the property in question, and that title
should be quieted to the Weitzes.
2)

Award them ownership, possession, and control of the property in question based

upon the adverse possession claim, due to the fact that all of the facts that are before this Court are
sufficient to establish such a ruling, and that title be quieted to the Weitzes. Or, in the alternative,
remand the matter to allow for the complaint to be amended as had been requested and for the
adverse possession claim to proceed accordingly.
3)

Dismiss the slander of title claim, and, thus, the award of attorney fees and costs for

the reasons set forth above.
4)

Dismiss the finding of trespass against them and find that the award of damages was

done so in error.
5)

Find the Weitzes' claim for trespass and damages was incorrectly dismissed by the

lower court.
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6)

Award of attorney fees on appeal aid also request they be deemed the prevailing

party, and that this matter be remanded in order to establish the appropriate amount of attorney fees
and costs by the lower court for handling the underlying matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 4th day of December, 2008.
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